

The evolution of European legal integration

Torsten J. Selck · Mark Rhinard · Frank M. Häge

Published online: 7 November 2007
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Abstract This article contributes to the development of theories on European integration by testing and exploring statistical models on the long-term development of legislative activity of the European Commission. Drawing on legal information gained from the European Union's *PreLex* database and analyzing it with the help of statistical analyses, we map out growth patterns of EU law between 1976 and 2003. We construct time-series models and models based on non-linear regression. While the performance of models based on the traditional theoretical approaches, inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism, is rather poor, the analysis suggests that nonlinear dynamic models might be an interesting avenue for future conceptualizations of the EU integration process.

Keywords European Union · European integration · Legal integration · Time-series analysis · Dynamic models · Intergovernmentalism · Neo-functionalism

This article is based on a paper presented at the *ECPR Standing Group on the European Union Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics*, “Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity”, 24–26 June 2004, Bologna, Italy. We would like to thank the seminar participants for useful comments.

T. J. Selck (✉)
School of Politics and International Relations, University Park NG7 2RD, UK
e-mail: torsten.selck@nottingham.ac.uk

M. Rhinard
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Drottning Kristinas väg 37, Box 27035,
Stockholm 102 51, Sweden
e-mail: mark.rhinard@ui.se

F. M. Häge
Department of Public Administration, P.O. Box 9555, Leiden 2300 RB, The Netherlands
e-mail: fhaege@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

JEL Classifications C22 · D72**1 Analyzing the evolving European Union**

Viewed from the experience of European integration over the past fifty years, Nietzsche's dictum that "a European policy is untenable" appears to be refuted (1999 [1884], 26, §336). The developments that the continent witnessed since the end of the Second World War until the present are better characterized by Hegel's words that a "constitution becomes progressively more mature in the course of the further elaboration of the laws and the advancing character of the universal business of government" (1997 [1821], §298).

How can the extraordinary development of post-World War II European integration be explained? As the European Union (EU) engages in harmonizing legislation for policy sectors that range from internal tariffs to fiscal and monetary matters, and even includes attempts to harmonize foreign and security policy, academics with backgrounds as diverse as law, history, political science, and economics have tried to trace and understand the developments from early cooperation in the coal and steel production of France and Germany to a polity of twenty-seven Member States engaged in producing a constitutional treaty.

This article contributes to the body of literature seeking to explain European integration. In contrast to most other texts on the development of the EU, this article relies on quantitative data and different types of statistical models to examine this process. Time-series and dynamic models are employed to track the development of EU legal integration. Tests of the major theoretical perspectives on European integration are conducted. Rather than restricting ourselves solely to testing hypotheses of some particular theoretical contribution, we hope that, in addition, the method of using statistical models in an exploratory fashion might stipulate further questions and at the same time refine our understanding about the evolution of the European Union and about an eventual equilibrium in terms of legislative output and level of regulation.

The results of our analysis put doubts on the findings of previous research, which claimed that European integration is driven by treaty revisions brought about through bargaining processes among Member States (Schneider and Cederman 1994; Moravcsik 1998) or linked to the volume of trans-national economic interaction (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Pitarakis and Tridimas 2003). Indeed, rather than being a continuously self-reinforcing process, there are indications that European legal integration might have reached a stable equilibrium in recent years. This finding lends credence to the evaluations of some observers of the EU (Hix 2005: 18–23), who speculate that European integration has reached a stable equilibrium and that the constitutional treaty is just an effort to further consolidate the existing level of integration. For example, one of the Vice Presidents of the European Commission, Günter Verheugen, is currently engaged in an effort to limit the number of new and existing EU legal measures (Verheugen 2005). As Westlake

and Galloway (2004: 403) put it, the existing “settlement... is expected to be ‘durable’”.

We proceed by briefly reviewing the theoretical literature on the subject under consideration. Then, a novel data set on European legal integration is introduced. We show the development of the number of policy documents introduced by the Commission over the last thirty years and contrast it with the predictions of the leading theoretical perspectives on the development of the EU. Concluding that the statistical evidence for the validity of any of those perspectives is at best inconclusive, the fourth section presents an alternative class of statistical models which might be used to better conceptualize the development of the Union. Section five concludes with a summary of the results and some suggestions for future research.

2 Existing theories on European integration

Theoretical work on the European integration process abounds.¹ Since a comprehensive review of this work is beyond the scope of the article, we will mainly focus on the two dominant perspectives in the field, *intergovernmentalism* and *neofunctionalism*. A major dividing line between the two views is the question of which political actors have decisive influence on the integration process. In the intergovernmentalist picture, the Member States are the dominating force (e.g. Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1991), while neofunctionalism views domestic societal groups in coalition with supranational actors as pushing the process of integration (Haas 1961, 2004 [1958]; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).²

The most recent and elaborate versions of these two strands of reasoning are presented by Andrew Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Nikolaidis 1999) and Alec Stone Sweet and his collaborators (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998), respectively. In what follows, we will briefly outline the main theoretical arguments of each theory and identify observable implications. The results of an empirical test of these predictions are reported in subsequent sections.

In the tradition of intergovernmentalist thinking, Moravcsik’s (1998) ‘liberal’ version identifies the bargaining outcomes of Member States over treaty revisions as the decisive factors in explaining European integration. The theory consists of three main building blocks (Moravcsik 1998: 18–85): first, Member States’ preferences are responsive to and shaped by the economic concerns of powerful

¹ For overviews see e.g. Rosamond (2000), Wallace and Wallace (2005), Weiler (1999), and Wiener and Dietz (2004).

² A third strand of research attempts to reconcile the differing claims of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Rational choice institutionalists argue that supranational agents like the European Court of Justice and the Commission anticipate the reactions of their principals, that is the Member States, when choosing their actions (Tridimas and Tridimas 2004; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Thus, the discretion of supranational agents depends on the preferences of principals and the institutional rules in place to reverse a Court decision. To examine this hypothesis of a contingent influence of supranational actors, the challenge for empirical research is to develop a measure for the preferences of the principals over time. We leave this task for future research.

domestic interest groups, particularly by producers of economic goods. Second, given these national economic interests, the outcome of negotiations among Member States with regard to the substance of the agreement is determined by their relative bargaining power, which is in turn inversely related to the value a Member State puts on reaching a collective agreement versus the value of its best unilateral policy alternative. Finally, the pooling and delegation of sovereignty is explained by Member States' desire to assure commitment to and future compliance with the substance of the bargain that has been struck. Obviously, the theory focuses predominantly on explaining the outcomes of treaty negotiations, but Moravcsik claims that such an approach also yields the best explanation for European integration at large (Moravcsik 1998: 18). Given the prominence of treaty revisions in the liberal intergovernmentalist account, we might expect the process of European integration to behave like a step-function with abrupt jumps or drops after a new treaty enters into force or after an existing one has been changed.

While liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the role of Member States' interests and relative bargaining power, and focuses on the 'high politics' of treaty revisions, Sweet Stone's theory of legal integration identifies the supranational institutions—The Commission, Parliament, and the Court of Justice—as the most important actors. They are seen to exert their influence through more mundane day-to-day decisions which are gradually but profoundly shaping the path of European integration. The theoretical argument goes as follows (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998: 63–5). As cross-border transactions among private actors increase, more and more conflicts about the correct interpretation of contracts between these actors will result. This leads to a higher social demand for third-party dispute-resolution through transnational law and the courts. In this picture, legislators and judges serve similar functions. The rules emanating from their decisions stabilize expectations among contracting partners and reduce transaction costs as well as legal uncertainty (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998: 64). Through lowering the costs of economic contracting, an effective transnational legal system in turn encourages even more exchange across borders. Thus, the legal system exhibits a "self-sustaining and expansionary dynamic" (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998: 65). In the EU, all the supranational organizations involved in law-making are exposed to the demand for common rules and regulations. However, the Commission and the European Court of Justice are of particular importance as a locus of pressure for transnational actors. They offer alternative influence channels to the Council of the EU with its often reticent national governments (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 12).

Due to the self-enforcing nature of the process, a general prediction of the theory is that European integration should proceed only gradually but continually increase. While this prediction stands in sharp contrast to the expectation generated by intergovernmentalism, it is hardly a strong test of the theory of legal integration, since such a pattern could be produced by any number of alternative explanations. In the empirical part of the article, we will thus follow previous research (Carruba and Murrah 2005; Pitarakis and Tridimas 2003; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998) in

testing the more nuanced hypothesis that intra-EU trade is positively related to the level of European integration.³

The next section outlines some empirical regularities of EU legal integration. We will look at the development of legislative activism of the Commission over time. This will also allow for a first preliminary evaluation of the predictions discerned above. Afterwards, the hypotheses are formally tested through time-series regression models. The explanatory power of these models is subsequently compared to a different class of models that conceptualize European integration as an evolutionary process.⁴

3 Empirical regularities of European legal integration

Few studies exist that attempt to model the process of European integration in a quantitative fashion. Exceptions are studies which model the duration of EU decision-making, (Sloot and Verschuren 1990; Golub 1999; Schulz and König 2000), work that tests game-theoretic models of EU decision-making (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Selck 2006; Thomson et al. 2006), and as noted above, studies that model European legal integration with the help of time-series analysis (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Pitarakis and Tridimas 2003).

For this article, we focus on modeling change over time and operationalize the *level of legal integration* as the intensity of legislative activism by the Commission. We measure legal integration by the number of documents transmitted per year to the EU legislators and other institutions involved in the European policymaking process. Note that this measure diverges from other empirical studies on EU legal integration in that it focuses more on the legislative process as initiated by the Commission and less on judicial review by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). For studies using ECJ activity in order to operationalize the concept of legal integration, see e.g. Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998), who used the amount of European Court of Justice references (preliminary ruling procedure, Art. 234 Treaty of Amsterdam [ex Art. 177]), and Pitarakis and Tridimas (2003), who reproduce the Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998) study with more recent data and a different model specification for the time-series data. Carruba and Murrah (2005) find that national factors such as economic activity and public support also affect the use of the preliminary ruling procedure.

Our operationalization relates directly to the two main theories contending to explain European integration and therefore allows for a comparative test. In the intergovernmentalist account, the Commission is only an agent of the Member States. Thus, its scope of activity should be directly linked to the powers transferred

³ All three studies test for a positive relationship between European legal integration and intra-EU trade. However, note that Pitarakis and Tridimas (2003) find that the causal link runs from the level of legal integration to trade volume rather than from trade volume to the level of legal integration. Carruba and Murrah (2005) also examine a host of other variables that might explain the cross-national variation in the use of the preliminary ruling system.

⁴ Note that, when we talk about *evolution* in the context of this article, we do not refer to a process characterized by processes such as mutation/modification or selection, but just to a dynamic process, i.e. a process unfolding over time (Shone 2002: 12).




Fig. 1 Annual number of EU Documents and Intra-EU trade in Goods from 1976 to 2003*. *Sources: *PreLex*; European Commission 2002 [years 1976–2000], 2004 [years 2001–2003]; (trade100 = trade * 100)

to it by Member States through the treaties and their successive revisions. In contrast, in the neo-functional theory of legal integration, the Commission has substantial leeway to pursue a proactive stance in EU policymaking. Increased intra-EU exchange supposedly leads to increased pressure on the EU institutions to produce supranational law which should, in the case of the particularly receptive Commission, lead to an increasing number of documents introduced.

For the following analysis, we rely on the *European Legal Integration* (ELI) data set, which covers data on legislative activity, intra-EU trade in goods and treaty revisions from 1976 to 2003. In compiling this data set, the data for our dependent variable, the number of Commission documents per year, was drawn from the Commission’s own database on inter-institutional procedures, *PreLex*.⁵ Following Pitarakis and Tridimas (2003: 362), the data on legislative activity (doc) was complemented with statistics of intra-EU trade (trade) that were found in the Commission’s own publication *European Economy* (European Commission 2002, 2004).⁶ In addition, we also included dummy variables that take the value of ‘1’ from the time a certain treaty revision came into force until the end of the study period and the value of ‘0’ otherwise. These were coded for the Single European Act (1987) (dsea), the Maastricht Treaty (1993) (dmaa) as well as for the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) (dams).

⁵ The variable represents *documents adopted by the Commission*, i.e. all documents generated by the European Commission during a certain year for the purposes of EU legislative decision-making. These documents include proposals for secondary legislation like directives, regulations, and decisions; but also reports, opinions, communications, green and white papers. Prelex “details all procedures opened by official documents (proposals, recommendations, communications etc.) transmitted by the Commission to the legislator (Council–Parliament) and to other institutions and bodies” (*Description of the Database* at <http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en#>). The database can be accessed via <http://europa.eu.int/prelex/>

⁶ The variable measures intra-EU exports of goods as a percentage of gross domestic product.

Figure 1 plots the annual number of Commission documents and intra-EU trade over time. The vertical lines in the figure represent the years when the three major treaty revisions became effective. The number of documents introduced by the Commission increases almost three-fold during the time-period under consideration. Intra-EU trade also shows an increase over the course of the years, although by far less steep than the rise in the Commission's legislative activity. Thus, the visual inspection of the graph does not lend firm support for the legal integration hypothesis.

Interestingly, the graph for the annual number of documents increases most sharply in the period *before* the Single European Act (1987), which is clearly not in accordance with the expectation derived from the liberal intergovernmentalist account. Although the picture is not as clear-cut with regard to the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, it seems that the Commission generally expanded its activity before rather than after treaty revisions. Overall, the results of the descriptive analysis put strong doubts on the validity of the intergovernmentalist claims that put Member State governments in the driving seat of European integration. The evidence with regard to the legal integration hypothesis is more ambiguous. Indeed, when regressing legislative activity against intra-EU trade and last year's number of documents (see below under Sect. 4.1) in a time-series model, the hypothesis seems to be supported. Figure 2 plots the predicted values of this regression and the number of documents. Even without discussing the regression estimates at this point, a casual inspection illustrates that the fit between the two graphs is rather good.

The statistical models presented in the following section will, among other things, put more light on the relationship between trade and Commission activity. It turns out that the evidence in favor of the legal integration hypothesis is far less convincing than suggested by the purely graphical inspection. Accounting for the insufficiency of both liberal intergovernmentalism and Sweet Stone's version of neo-functionalism to account for the empirical pattern, we then proceed to explore alternative model specifications.




Fig. 2 Time-series graph of EU Documents

4 Statistical models of legal integration

There are different options for modeling a time-series. In time-series regression, an important question is whether to merely rely on other independent variables as covariates, or whether to also include lagged dependent variables (e.g. to use today's temperature order to predict tomorrow's temperature) in the regression equation (Achen 2000).

Further, we can distinguish between time-series regression on the one hand and non-linear specifications that can be attributed to dynamic models, and in particular to growth models (Turchin 2003) on the other hand. Here, the first type of models will be used to test the predictions generated by the integration theories discussed earlier. The other type will be used to explore some alternative functional forms of the integration process. The findings from the latter will then be interpreted in the light of existing EU theory.

4.1 Time-series models

OLS regression is normally based on some vector of independent variables in order to explain a certain class of empirical phenomena. Equation 1 displays the bivariate regression model.

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

Time-series analysis (Hamilton 1994), on the other hand, is based on the inclusion of lagged dependent variables which are used as covariates.⁷ In its purest form, the approach does not use any covariates at all but an *autoregressive moving average* (ARIMA) of a variable's past behavior. Using only one lag and no other covariates, the functional form can then be given in the following way.

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \alpha y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

The covariates of Eqs. 2 and 1 can also be integrated into one single model to account for both the variable's past behavior as well as other explanatory factors suggested by political or economic theory.

$$y_t = \beta_0 + \alpha y_{t-1} + \beta_1 x_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

We will continue by testing different statistical specifications of these models based on the on the ELI data set. Five models have been computed. The first one (1.1) consists simply of the amount of last year's volume of documents. The next two models drop the lagged term and predict legal integration purely as a function of treaty revisions (1.2) and trade volume (1.3), respectively. The remaining models

⁷ See also Greene (1997) and Kennedy (1999).

Table 1 Time-series models*

Model	Description	Adj. R^2
1.1	$\text{doc}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{doc}_{t-1}$	0.82
1.2	$\text{doc}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{dsea} + \beta_2 \text{dmaa} + \beta_3 \text{dams}$	0.69
1.3	$\text{doc}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{trade}$	0.49
1.4	$\text{doc}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{dsea} + \beta_2 \text{dmaa} + \beta_3 \text{dams} + \beta_4 + \text{doc}_{t-1}$	0.81
1.5	$\text{doc}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{trade} + \beta_2 \text{doc}_{t-1}$	0.83

* For all models, $p > F = 0.0000$; $N = 27$. We abstain from providing variable coefficients here because, rather than to assess the explanatory power of individual predictors, the main purpose of this article is to compare models that represent “complete data generating processes” (Morton 1999: 107)

(1.4 and 1.5) use both predictors. Table 1 presents the results. We regard the different specifications as models of the complete data generating process (Morton 1999: 107). Thus, the table indicates the overall model performance in terms of the explained variance of the dependent variable rather than the statistical significance of individual variable coefficients.

First note that Model 1.1 already yields an extremely high adjusted R^2 of 82. Arguably, this is due to the fact that the process of European integration has seen many ‘ups’ and almost no ‘downs’, and is by itself characterized as following a rather non-complex pattern.

Model 1.2 performs with an adjusted R^2 of 0.69 surprisingly well, given that the descriptive evidence was rather disappointing for the intergovernmentalist hypothesis. Nevertheless, among the three treaty variables, only the variable for the Single European Act shows a positive and statistically significant relationship with Commission activity.

Model 1.3, with trade volume as an independent variable, yields an adjusted R^2 of 0.49, which is still rather high if compared to many other applications in the social sciences. For their data, Stone Sweet and Brunel (1998: 69) report an even higher number of 0.73. Although it accounts for a substantially smaller amount of variation in the dependent variable as compared to the intergovernmentalist model 1.2, it also has to be recognized that the latter model employs two more parameters in its estimation.

The good performance of both the intergovernmentalist and the neo-functional explanation suffers if the lagged number of documents is included in the model specifications to account for auto-correlation. Likelihood-ratio tests after model estimations show that neither the inclusion of treaty dummies (model 1.4, $p > \chi^2 = 0.7991$) nor of the trade variable (model 1.5, $p > \chi^2 = 0.1588$) improves the model fit. To conclude this section, neither Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism nor Sweet Stone’s version of neo-functionalism seems well equipped to yield a satisfactory explanation of the dynamics of European legal integration. The next section explores the fit of an alternative class of statistical models whose explicit purpose is to account for more complicated developmental patterns over time.

4.2 Growth models

A different way of statistical modeling is based on non-linear regression. In formal terms, this method finds its equivalent in *dynamic models* of political, economic or historic change (Cederman 2001; Shone 2002; Turchin 2003). Growth models in particular are often used to predict organizational development (Hannan and Freeman 1977). For example, we might assume that an organization such as the European Union first displays slow growth patterns during the period of its ‘infancy’, then matures and picks up speed in institutional development, and that at some point some natural limit is reached and the process becomes ‘saturated’. Such a view of the unfolding process of European legal integration would result in specifying a model which is based on a logistic growth function. This point appears to be reached. As of late, there appears to be a drive to consolidate the existing body of EU law and to drop some of the currently pending new legal initiatives (Financial Times 2005; Verheugen 2005).

Increasing functional complexity step by step, we follow Turchin (2003: 9–10), and compute four simple dynamic models. The first one predicts legal integration on the EU level to grow in a linear fashion, the second one expects positive exponential—or Malthusian—growth, the third one expects negative exponential growth, and the last model is based on the logistic function. The results are shown in Table 2.

The first model (2.1), linear growth, simply fits a straight line through the data points. The result in terms of adjusted R^2 is 0.83, which again can be considered rather high for such a simplistic specification, and in comparison to more complex time-series models which make use of exogenous variables such as trade. Model 2.2 is equal to the 2.1 in terms of variable input, but it differs in functional complexity. The higher adjusted R^2 of 0.98 has then to be weighed against the greater parsimony of Model 2.1 (Selck, 2005). Finally, Model 2.3 assumes a positive logistic growth function as the underlying process that drives integration, and yields an adjusted R^2 of 0.99.

For illustrative purposes, Fig. 3 graphs the logistic growth function. The graph displays a scatterplot of documents over time and the positive logistic function that runs through the data. As high as the adjusted R^2 of Model 2.3 is, we have to question whether this model outperforms Model 2.2’s 0.98, which is again based on a simpler functional form. In the last section that follows, some tentative remarks on interpretation of the findings in the light of theorizing on the EU will conclude the article.

Table 2 Growth models*

Model	Description	Ajd. R^2
2.1	Linear growth: $y_- = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x$	0.83
2.2	Exponential growth: $y_- = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \beta_2^x$	0.98
2.3	Logistic growth: $y_- = \beta_0 + \beta_1 / (1 + \exp(-\beta_2(x - \beta_3)))$	0.99

* For all models, $p > F = 0.0000$; $N = 28$. The statistical specifications follow Hamilton (1998: 201)




Fig. 3 A logistic growth model of European legal integration

5 Towards dynamic models of the emergent European polity

The objective of this article was to present a quantitative application regarding the development of European legal integration. To that end, we first tested some predictions of the two prevailing approaches in the field, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, on different time-series models. The empirical analysis showed that both approaches have problems in explaining the dynamics of integration. We then turned to explore the potential of growth models to account for the integration process.

Two preliminary findings of the analysis are the following. First, all the statistical applications in this article—the time series models and the growth models—predict the time series quite well. Second, the inclusion of substantial variables into a time-series model consisting of only the previous year's level of EU legal integration proves to be statistically insignificant. This means that integration might be neither substantially linked to trade (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunel 1998) nor to treaty revisions (Moravcsik 1998).

We might assume that, like most other growth process, the EU will finally settle into some equilibrium state with a more or less stable amount of law production over different time periods. According to Hix (2005), the process of trying to establish an EU constitutional treaty might be just a sign of further consolidation of the existing level of integration rather than the start of building more political union.

Arguably, the growth models we used were quite simplistic. Nonetheless, in terms of explained variance, they outperformed time-series models that used exogenous information as stipulated by existing empirical research in the field. Avenues for future research might include: (a) to further disaggregate the units of analysis over time, (b) to disaggregate information over policy sectors and thereby add information on the actual legal and political significance of different sorts of legislative documents, (c) to include other theoretically informed covariates, and (d) to link the statistical modeling closer to the original EU theories on the one hand and to formal dynamic models of political economy on the other.

Appendix

The ELI data set*

Year	Number of documents	Intra-EU trade volume in goods
1976	494	12.6
1977	660	12.6
1978	585	12.4
1979	653	13.4
1980	905	13.3
1981	732	13.1
1982	685	13.5
1983	619	13.7
1984	1066	14.5
1985	1200	14.9
1986	1319	13.5
1987	1234	14.1
1988	1279	14.2
1989	1125	14.9
1990	1287	14.5
1991	1250	13.8
1992	1332	13.4
1993	1404	12.6
1994	1203	13.6
1995	1291	14.5
1996	1467	14.6
1997	1422	15.5
1998	1597	15.4
1999	1566	15.6
2000	1555	16.9
2001	1619	16.9
2002	1465	16.3
2003	1445	16.7

* The observations for the analysis in this article are years

References

- Achen, Christopher H. (2000). Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables (2000). *Political Methodology Working Papers*, <http://polmeth.wustl.edu/papers/00/achen00.pdf>.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, & Frans, N. Stokman (Eds.), (1994). *European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

- Carruba, Clifford J., & Lacey Murrah (2005). Legal integration and use of the preliminary ruling process in the European union. *International Organization*, 59, 399–418.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik (2001). Back to kant: Reinterpreting the democratic peace as a macrohistorical learning process. *American Political Science Review*, 95(1), 15–31.
- European Commission (2002). *Statistical Annex of European Economy*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/European_economy/2002/statannex0202_en.pdf.
- European Commission (2004). *Statistical Annex of European Economy*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2004/statannex0104_en.pdf.
- Financial Times* (2005). 'Barroso Drive on 'Absurd' EU Laws', 13 September.
- Golub, Jonathan (1999). In the shadow of the vote? decision making in the European community. *International Organization*, 53, 733–764.
- Greene, William H. (1997). *Econometric analysis*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Haas, Ernst B. (1961). International integration: The European and the universal process. *International Organization*, 15(3), 366–392.
- Haas, Ernst B. (2004 [1958]). *The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces 1950–1957*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Hamilton, James Douglas (1994). *Time-series analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hamilton, Lawrence C. (1998). *Statistics with Stata 5*. Brooks/Cole: Pacific Grove.
- Hannan, Michael T., & John, Freeman (1977). The population ecology of organizations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(5), 929–964.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1997 [1821]). Philosophy of right. In Steven Cahn (Ed.), *Classics of modern political theory* (pp 736–835). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hix, Simon (2005). *The political system of the European union*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoffman, Stanley (1966). Obsolete or obsolete: The fate of the nation state and the case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*, 95(4), 862–915.
- Kennedy, Peter (1999). *A guide to econometrics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Lindberg, Leon N., & Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). *Europe's would-be polity: Patterns of change in the European community*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1991). Negotiating the single European act: National interests and conventional statecraft in the European community. *International Organization*, 45(1), 651–688.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. London: UCL Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew and Kalypso Nikolaidis (1999). Explaining the treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, influence, institutions. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37, 57–85.
- Morton, Rebecca (1999) *Methods and models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1999). *Nachlaß 1884–1885*. Berlin: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Pitarakis, Jean-Yves, & George, Tridimas (2003). Joint dynamics of legal and Economic integration in the European union. *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 16, 357–368.
- Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories on European integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Sandholtz, Wayne, & Alec Stone, Sweet (Eds.), (1998). *European integration and supranational governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneider, Gerald, & Lars-Erik Cederman (1994). The change of tide in political cooperation: A limited information model of European integration. *International Organization*, 48, 633–662.
- Schulz, Heiner, & Thomas König (2000). Institutional reform and decision-making efficiency in the European union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44, 653–666.
- Selck, Torsten J. (2006). *Preferences and procedures: European union legislative decision-making*. New York: Springer.
- Shone, Ronald (2002). *Economic dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slout, Thomas, & Piet Verschuren (1990). Decision making speed in the European community. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 29, 75–85.
- Stone Sweet, Alec, & Thomas, Brunell (1998). Constructing a supranational constitution: Dispute resolution and governance in the European community. *American Political Science Review*, 92(1), 63–81.
- Stone Sweet, Alec, & Wayne Sandholtz (1998). Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European polity. In Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet (Eds.), *European integration and supranational governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Thomson, Robert, Frans, N. Stokman, Christopher, H. Achen & Thomas, König (Eds.), (2006). *The European union decides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tridimas, George, & Tridimas, P. Takis (2004). National courts and the European court of justice. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 24(2), 125–145.
- Tsebelis, George, & Geoffrey, Garrett (2001). The institutional foundations of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the European union. *International Organization*, 55(2), 357–390.
- Turchin, Peter (2003). *Historical dynamics: Why states rise and fall*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Verheugen, Günter (2005). Less red tape = More growth, press conference “better regulation”, Brussels, 16 March 2005.
- Wallace, Helen, & William Wallace (2005). *Policy making in the European union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weiler, Joseph (1999). *Constitution of Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Westlake, Martin, & David, Galloway (Eds.), (2004). *The council of the European union*. London: John Harper.
- Wiener, Antje, & Thomas, Diez (Eds.), (2004). *European integration theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.